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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in “Design of Lightning Protection for a Full- 
Authority Digital Engine Control” [l], FADEC systems present 
many challenges to the lightning protection engineer. In addition, 
verification of the protection-design adequacy for certification pur- 
poses presents additional challenges. In particulary close coordina- 
tion between the airtiame manufacturer and the suppliers of systems 
and subsystems is required. 
The basic requirement of the certification plan of a FADEC 
system is to demonstrate compliance with Federal Airworthiness 
Regulations (FAR) 25.1309 [2] and 25.581. Certain FAR Issue 
Papersmaybe applicableandthe forthcomingFAR25.1315 [3] will 
clarify some ambiguities in the FARs pertaining to lightning protec- 
tion of flight-critical andessential systems. These FARs are intended 
for transport aircraft, but there are equivalent sections for general 
aviation aircraft, normal and transport rotorcraft. Military aircraft 
may have additional requirements. 
The criteria for demonstration of adequate lightning protection 
for a FADEC system includes the procedures outlined in Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 20-136 
“Protection of aircraft electricaVelectronic systems against the indi- 
rect effects of lightning.” [4] As FADEC systems, including the 
interconnecting wiring, are generally not susceptible to direct attach- 
ment of lightning currents, this paper deals primarily with the 
verification of protection against indirect effects. 
It is the responsibility of the airFrame manufacturer or system 
integrator to provide the overall assurance of adequate lightning 
protection. However, it is often the case that the airframer’s ceitifi- 
cation plan will refer to test or analysis plans conducted by system 
suppliers. 
2.0 VERIFICATION METHODS 
accomplished by the following procedures: 
Verification of protection against lightning indirect effects is 
1. Demonstrating that actual transient levels in the 
interconnecting wiring do not exceed theestablishedTCLs 
for the wiring. 
2. Demonstrating that the individual equipment will tolerate 
the ETDLs without component damage. 
3. Demonstratingthat interconnectedandoperating systems 
will tolerate the applicable ETDLs (as applied to the cables 
of an interconnected system) without component damage 
or system hctional upset. 
The accepted methods of verification are through similarity of 
design with existing systems or aircraft, mathematical analysis or 
through simulated lightning testing. 
2.1 SIMILARITY 
Verification by similarity must be demonstrated by detailed 
comparisons of drawings, parts lists, system opting parameters 
and installation details. The certification plan must show that the 
FADEC systems, and the portions of the airframe which contain the 
systems, are identical to a previously certified system from a 
lightning-protection standpoint. Most importantly, the certification 
plan must show that TCLs, ETDLs and margins will remain similar. 
As FADEC systems are relatively new to the transport aircraft 
market and because of the rapidly developing technology of elec- 
tronic control systems, certification entirely through similarity is 
rare. 
2.2 ANALYSIS 
Mathematical analysis is often used in the development stages of 
an aircraft, before prototypes are available, to determine the levels of 
lightning-induced transients that may be expected. For certification 
purposes, the use of “acceptable” mathematical analysis is often 
l i i t ed  to certification documents describing lightning protection 
for small engineering changes. More frequently, analysis is used in 
conjunction with one or both of the other forms of verification. A 
common example is the extrapolation of the effects of high current 
fromtheresults ofalow-current test.Analysisshouldalwaysinc1ude 
the worst-case scenario. Generally, verification by analysis will 
require significantly higher margins between TCL and ETDL than 
other forms. 
2.3 TESTING 
Conceptually it would be best to perform &&threat testing on 
fidly configured and operational aircraft, performed either on a Go/ 
No-Go basis or with a measurement and analysis scheme. This is 
seldom practical, however, primarily because of the cost and com- 
plexity of the required test equipment, test specimen and test facility. 
Therefore, to determine the indirect-effects protection of a FADEC 
system, testing will usually consist of two general categories of 
simulations: aircraft-level tests such as lightning transient analysis 
(LTA), used to determine the TCLs in the airframe or major sections 
of the airframe, and ETDL tests, performed with FADEC system 
components installed in the airframe. The second main category 
consists ofavariety ofbenchtestsperformed on systemcomponents 
to assess protection against damage and functional upset. 
2.4 TCL VERIFICATION 
following methods: 
Verification of TGL will be accomplished by one of the 
* Performance of a full-vehicle lightning test, in which 
reduced-scale pulses of current with waveforms of 
components AandH arecirculatedthroughtheaircraftand 
measurements are made of actual transients induced in 
typical individual conductors and bulk cables associated 
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with the flight criticallessential systems. The measured 
transients are then extrapolated linearly to predict the 
levels that would be induced by full-threat component A 
and H currents. This procedure is also known as an LTA 
test. Measurements are made on representative circuits/ 
cables, in accordance with a detailed test plan. 
9 Computation of anticipated actual transient waveforms/ 
levels in representative wirdcables by analysis based on 
f d  principles (laws of electromagnetic effects, aircraft 
. material properties and geometry). The analytical 
areverified by comparisonwithavailable 
* A combination of both of the above procedures. The 
extent to which each method will be employed will be 
detailed in test and/or analysis plans, to be submitted to 
rimorthiness catifying authorities for approval. 
2.5 E T D L ~ ~ I C A ~ O N  
Verification of compliance with the ETDLs specified is to be 
accomplished by tests conducted by the system or equipment ven- 
dors in accordance with test plans to be submitted by them to the 
airframe manufacturer for approval. Two test methods will be 
employed, as follows: 
Pin-injection tests in which full-scale voltagdcurrent 
transients are applied (in most cases) between individual 
pins and case ground to verify circuit board component 
tolerance of the specified ETDLs. 
* Bullcable tests, in which the specified cable ETDLs 
(bulk-cable currents) are bansformer coupled or directly 
injected into interconnecting cables, with the system 
powered up and operatiag. The primary purpose of these 
testsis to verifjrthat thesystem doesnotupset,althoughthe 
test also verifies protection against system-related damage 
effects. 
3.0 CE ATION PLAN FORA 
ROTO T FADEC/ENGINE 
SYSTEM 
The following example of a certification plan for a hypothetical 
system provides detailed procedures applicable to most FADEC 
applications. This example addresses specifics for a rotorcraft 
FADEC/engine system, designated LTI-1O00, including an Elec- 
tronic Control Unit (ECU) and a Hydromechanical Control Unit 
(HMU). However, the general procedures and steps would be appli- 
cable for fixed-wing aircraft installation of the same or similar 
engine system, though changes in some ofthe ETDLs and TCLsmay 
be necessary. The certification plan would begin with several brief 
introductory sections describing the purpose and citing the specific 
FAA and DoD requirements relevant to the rotorcraft. Our example 
begins after the opening paragraphs: 
- provide an overview of the system and application. 
- state goals of certification plan. 
- cite specific FARS, ACs, MIL-STDs and issue papers as 
3.2 PURPOSE 
3.3 UI ENTS 
3.4 LIGHTNING CRlTERIA 
The lightning environment which the helicopter (or fixed-wing 
aircraft) must withstand is defined in Appendix I11 ofAC 20-136 [4] 
and Section 3.3 of MIL-STD-1795. [5]  
These references define the same lightning environment, which 
is represented by current components A through D, a multiplestroke 
arrangement ofcomponentsAandD/2,andamultipleburstenviron- 
ment. These components are M y  defmed in the aforementioned 
ref- andwill not be described fiurtherhere. They representthe 
characteristicsoflightning-stmkecurrentsentering, flowingthroltgh 
and exiting fiom an aircrafi. 
Applicability of individual components of the lightning enviro& 
ment to specific airframe surfaces or structures depends on the 
lightning strike zones of such surfaces/structures. Zone definitions 
are also found in AC 20-136 [4] and MIGSTD1795A. [5] 
3.5 STEPS IN DESIGNAND 
This section describes the steps W i g  followed in design and 
verification of lightning protection for the LTI-loo0 electronic 
control system. The steps described herein are similar to those in 
Section 7 of FAA AC 20-134 [4] (Steps athrough g). Several of the 
steps include performance of tests. Plans for these tests are provided 
in separate documents, referenced herein. 
3.5.1 Step a - Locate the lightning-strike zones 
The LTI-loo0 engine installed in the helicopter isnot susceptible 
to direct lightning strikes. Instead, they are subject to lightning 
strikes conducted on and off the engine via the drive shaft, engine 
mounts, electrical wiring harnesses, fuel and drain lines. Systems 
and components exposed to such conducted currents are in zone 3, 
see Figure 1. 
3.5.2 Step b - Establish the external environment 
for the zones 
The external environment components applicable to specific 
zonesare found in Appendix 111 of AC 20-1 36 [4], reproduced herein 
as Table 1. 
Table 1 - Zonal Application of the External 
Environment for Determination of Indirect Eflects 
Zone Current Waveforms 
A B C D Multiple Multiple 
Burst Stroke 
1A x x  X X 
1B x x x x  X X 
2A X X X X 
2B x x x  X X 
3 x x x x  X X 
Note: Indirect effects resulting from components B and C are 
usually insignificant. 
. .  
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FIGURE I Strike zones for helicopters 
Since components B and C produce insignificant indirect effects 
and the effects of component D are exceeded by those of component 
A, the LTElOOO electronic control system is being designed to 
tolerate the indirect effects of current component A and the multiple- 
stroke and multiple-burst environments being conducted through the 
airframe. Since the LTI-lo00 will be employed in a helicopter, the 
zone 3 currents will be conducted into the engine via the main rotor 
shafi,gearboxandengine output shafi. Lightning current will exit the 
engine via all other electrically continuous paths between the engine 
and the airframe. 
~~ ~~~~~~ 
3.5.3 Step c - Estab 
The internal lightning environment consists of lightning currents 
conducted into and out ofthe engine via the aforementioned conduc- 
tivepaths. Theamount oflightningcurrentthatmay flow ineachpath 
cannot be determined exactly by analysis, due to the complexity of 
the airframe and engine installation design and difficulty of quanti- 
fying electrical impedances associated with mechanical parts. How- 
ever, gross estimates can be made of current magnitudes and, if 
simplifying assumptions are made on a worst-case basis, the result- 
ing magnitudes will be higher than those actually experienced. 
3.5.3.1.1 Current entering engine 
Nearly all lightning strikes to a helicopter enter the mainrotor and 
exit from one or more of the lower extremities such as landing gear, 
skids, or tail boom. The lightning current path to an engine is 
illustrated basically in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows a single-engine installation. In this figure, the 
following simplifications have been made, which result in the 
percentage of current entering the engine being higher than is 
actually expected to occur. 
Simplifying Assumptions 
~Cunentpathsthroughrotorpitch controlrodsareomitted. . IOO% of external lightning current is expected to enter 
main bearing assembly. 
*50%oflightningcunent isassumedto flow throughmain 
bearingto output shaft(s),eventhoughotherlow-impedance 
paths exist to the airframe via the mechanical-load paths 
(thrust amounts) and a variety of control and sensor paths. 
* A singleengine and output shaft is assumed. Twin output 
shafts would share the engine current, resulting in less 
current to each engine. 
Main Rotor 
1 
100% 
Airframe 
Gearbox 
, . .  - . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . .  . . . .  
50% Via 
Rearing 
Mounts 
10% Exits 40% Exits Engine 
Gearbox 
Mounts Other Paths 
FIGURE 2 Basic Iightning current paths to engine in rotor craft applications 
* assumed lightning current distributions 
Thus, the percentages of lightning current assumed to flow into 
the gearbox (50%) and engine (40%) are higher than actual, though 
the amount of margin cannot be determined. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that 40% ofthe applicable full-threat, 
external lightning-current components, (components A, D!2, and H) 
will enter the engine via its output shaft and exit the engine via the 
engine mounts and other available paths. These current magnitudes 
are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Lightning Currents Entering Engine 
levels (TCL) 
actual transient 
levels 
The currents of Table 2 represent the internal lightning environ- 
ment applicable to the LTI-IO00 engine. 
_- -- I 
3.5.3.1.2 Currents exiting engine 
The lightning current that entered the engine via its output shaft 
will exit fiom the engine via avariety ofconductive paths. These are 
listed in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Current Exit Pathsfrom Engine Path 
If the current divided evenly, approximately 5 kA would flow 
from the engine to the airframe via each path. Actually, the magni- 
tude of current in each path is determined by its impedance as 
compared with the impedances of other paths, with the highest 
currents flowing in the lowest impedance paths. The shortest, most 
direct paths to the airframe will have the lowest impedance and the 
highest current. These include the gearbox and engine-mount struts. 
The metal cross sections and other aspects ofthe struts and other 
mechanical paths are fully capable of conducting their share of the 
lightning current sandno furtherconsiderationswillbegiventothem 
in this plan. 
It is necessary to establish the peak amplitudes of lightning 
currents flowing in the shields of ECS wiring harness as these 
become part of the TCL and ETDL specifications. For protection 
design purposes, it is assumed that current is shared equally among 
all exit paths and that ECS shield currents are as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 - ECS Harness Shield Currents (engine-to- 
airjraine) 
The fact that the ECS shield currents do not, in fact, exceed the 
levels of Table 4 will be verified by test of an engine in a simulated 
helicopter installation, as described in Section 3.5.7 (step g). 
3.5.4 Step d - Identify the flight-criticavessential 
systems 
The LTI-lo00 ECS is assumed to be flight-critical as the engine 
is being certified for single- as well as twin-engine applications. All 
components of this system, including the ECU, engine-mounted 
accessories and interconnecting wiring harness are assumed to be 
flight-critical. 
The ECS is exposed only to lightning indirect-strike effects in 
accordance with its zone 3 installation. The engine and ECS are 
protected from direct lightning strikes by the main rotor and the 
engine cowling, which are above the engine. 
3.5.5 Step e - Establish transient control and design 
levels 
The ETDLs represent the amplitude@) of voltage(s) andor 
current(@ that the ECS equipment is required to tolerate and remain 
operational without damage or system-functional upset. These levels 
are set higher than the maximum amplitude of transients that are 
allowed to be induced in interconnecting wiring and appear at 
equipment interfaces, which are the TCLs. The relationship between 
TCLs and ETDLs is illustrated in Figure 3. The ETDL is part of the 
specifications for the ECS electrical/electronic components. TCLs 
and ETDLs are defined in terms ofthe open circuit voltage (Voc) and 
the short circuit current (isc) appearing at wiring/equipment inter- 
faces, and the currents in the shields of ECS interconnecting wiring 
harness. The “V” and “i“ will be related by the source impedances 
(Le,, loop impedance) ofinterconnecting wiring, and different levels 
have been established for signal circuits and 28 VDC power circuits. 
The waveformdlevels defined in Appendix IV of FAA AC 20-136 
[4] have been utilized to establish TCLs and EDTLs for cable shields 
and connector interfaces. 
The equipment transient susceptibility level, also shown on 
Figure 3, is the amplitude ofvoltage or current which, when applied 
to the equipment, would result in damage to components or upset 
such that the equipment canno longerperform its intended function. 
This level is higher than the ETDL, and is not specified. 
The TCLs and ETDLs for the single-engine helicopter installa- 
tion are defined as individual connector pin-to-case (Voc) and 
r- -, equipment transient 
I 4 I susceptibility levels , 1 i equipment transient 
design level (ETDL) 
FIGURE 3 Relationships between transient levels 
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current (isc) waveforms and levels, as this condition is where the 
highest levels of induced effects are expected to appear in the 
helicopter circuits. This is the maoner in which verification tests of 
equipment will be performed, as described in 3.5.7 (step g). 
For design and verification of protection against system upset, a 
bulk-cable current is also defined. This represents the total voltage 
and/or current that can be induced in the loop formed between a 
complete cable shield and the adjacent engine or airframe. For 
overbraid shielded cables, or cables comprised entirely of individu- 
ally shielded pairs, this is defined as a bulk-cable current. For 
verification test purposes, the levels will be directly injected or 
transformer coupled into the interconnecting cable while the system 
is powered up and operating, for the purpose ofverifying protection 
against system-related damage and upset, as described briefly in 
section 3.5.7 (step g) and the referenced test plans. 
All of the ETDLs are defined in the multiple-stroke mode, as 
defined in AC 20-1 36 [4] (one full-amplitude transient correspond- 
ing to the fvst return stroke, Component A, followed by twenty-three 
transients corresponding to subsequent strokes, Component D/2). 
Specific TCLs and ETDLs established for the interconnecting 
wiring and electrical/electronic components are shown in Table 5. 
Notes: 1. Waveforms and levels are defined in FAA AC 20-136 
[4], Appendix IV. 
2. Short-circuit current specification (isc) may be reduced from 
the level defined in AC 20-1 36 [4] if line-to-case ground impedance 
at airframe or engine-mounted accessory is determined to be grater 
than the impedance (5 ohms or 25 ohms) implied in the definition. In 
no case may the isc level be less than that produced by a 1 00-ohm 
impedance. If the isc specification is reduced in this manner, the 
ability of the remote interface to withstand the specified ETDL must 
be verified by transient test. 
3. The specified shield-current amplitude is  the current at the 
ECU interface (connectors El, E2 and E3). Cunents in branches of 
intra-engine harness shields will be lower. The total of currents in 
each branch will equal the specified current at the ECU connector. 
4. The short-circuit (isc) current is as specified and may not be 
reduced as described in Note 2. 
Table S LTI-1000 Equipment Transient Design and 
Control Levels 
Thetransient levelspresented inTable5 representamargin of2:l 
or greater between ETDLs and associated TCLs, in accordance with 
advicegiveninSection9ofFA4AC20-136.TheTCLselectionsare 
intended to encompass the actual transient levels (ATLs) of the 
shielded conductors, and are generally based on an assumedhamess- 
shield transfer impedance of 0.05 volt ofconductor voltage per amp 
of shield current; a value typical of short-length shielded harness, 
such as employed between the ECU and other engine-mounted 
accessories. Thus, ifthe shield-harness TCL is 5 kAas listed in Table 
5, the conductor voltage, Vc would be, 
Vc = (0.05 V/A) (5,000 A) = 250 volts 
hence, a TCL of 300 volts for waveform 4, as defined in AC 20- 
136 [4]. 
The harness-shield TCLs have been based on experience with 
similar-sized engines and installations. Verification that actual- 
shield currents (sometimes called bulk-cable currents) do not exceed 
these levels will be accomplished by test of an engine with typical 
intra-engine and engine-airframe harnesses installed, as described 
briefly in section 3.5.7 (Step g) and the referenced test plans. 
If actual harness-shield currents are found to be higher than the 
proposed TCLs, the TCLs and corresponding ETDLs will be in- 
creased proportionately or a design change will be implemented to 
reduce the ATLs. 
3.5.6 Step f - Design protection 
The LTI-lo00 ECS is designed to minimize the magnitudes of 
lightning-inducedtransients on the wireharness shields andconduc- 
tors, and to provide protection at the component (box) level in cases 
where expected transients would otherwise exceed component toler- 
ance levels. Some of the protective measures incorporated in the 
LTI-lo00 ECS design are listed in Table 6. The adequacy ofeach of 
thosemeasures will beverifiedbythe tests describedinsection3.5.7 
(step g). 
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Table 6 - ECS Protective Measures 
Protective Measure Result 
8 I~proved electrical bonding 
between accessories and engine 
e Shielding of all intra-engine 
harnesses; shields grounded at 
both ends insignificant levels 
Reduces potential differences 
Reduces magnetic field coupling 
to signal conductors to 
0 Transient suppression diodes 
at ECU interfaces to 
sensitive circuits 
Reduces incoming transients to levels 
that can be tolerated by circuit 
board components 
0 ~ u a l - c ~ ~ n n e l  design 
and operation I Provides a second operational channel to perform control functions in the event the first is upset or damaged 
8 Isolation of electrical circuits Reduces induced currents to low 
levels, reducing stress at ECU interfaces 
S.7 Step g - Verify protection adequacy 
The adequacy ofthe LTElOOO ECS design to withstand lightning 
indirect effects will be verified by four series of tests. Two of these 
verify that actual transients induced in the interconnecting wiring do 
not exceed the established TCLs, and the other two verify that the 
ECU and other engine-mounted electrical components can safely 
tolerate the ETDL. These tests are described briefly in the following 
subsections. Complete descriptions are followed in the referenced 
test plans. 
~ransient control level (TCL) 
3.5.7.1.1 Harness shield currents 
Verification that the ECS harness-shield currents do not exceed 
the shield-current TCLs listed in Table 5 will be accomplished by 
tests of an engine with ECS components and interconnecting wire 
harness installed. In these tests, the simulated-lightning currents will 
be injected into the output shaft and allowed to exit the engine via 
simulated mounting struts, drains, harness shields and each of the 
other conductive paths listed in Table 3. These tests will be con- 
ducted on an EM1 test rig, which consists ofan engine case equipped 
with all engine-mounted accessories and suspended within a fiame 
above a ground plane via insulating straps. This enables the actual 
exit paths to be simulated with metal straps, harnesses, etc. Measure- 
ments will be made of currents induced in the ECS intra-engine 
wiriig harness, including all of its branches. These are the shield 
currents referred to in Table 5. The engine-airframe cable will also 
be represented in the test so that a measurement can be made of 
current in its shield. In addition, measurements will be made of 
currents exiting the engine via the other paths, for comparison with 
the original assumptions. 
The ECS harness-shield current tests are described more filly in 
3.5.7.1.2 Conductor voltages and currents 
Actual transient voltages induced in conductors within the ECS 
engine harness will be determined by test of an actual intra-engine 
harness. In this test, the shield currents determined fiom the engine 
test of section 3.5.7.1.1. will be injected into the intra-engine and 
measurements will be made of the voltages induced in conductors 
within. This test is conducted on a bench with conductors shorted to 
shields at remote (accessory) ends of the shield branches so that all 
of the conductor voltage and current can be measured at the ECU 
ends. Measurements will be made of induced voltage at open, 
ungrounded ends of conductors extending into each branch of the 
cable (the open-circuit voltage,Voc) and ofthe current flowing in the 
same conductors when both ends are shorted to the shield (the short- 
circuit current, isc) as theseare theparameters by which theTCLsare 
defined. 
Details of the intra-engine harness test are presented in the 
referenced Test Plan #2. 
Actual transient levels in the conductors within the engine- 
airframe harness will not be measured during this test, as this harness 
is fiunished by the airfiame manufacturer. The TCLs and ETDLs 
established for the airframe interfaces in Table 5 will become part of 
the enginelairframe interface specification. 
3.5.7.2 Equipment transient design level (ETDL) 
verification 
3.5.7.2.1 Damage tolerance 
Verification of ECS component compliance with the ETDLs 
1istedinTable 5 will be accomplished by pin-injection tests, in which 
111-scale transients defined in Table 5 and Appendix IV of AC 20- 
136 [4] will be injected into equipment connector-pins, between 
individual pins andcasegrounds.These testsverifyabilityofcimit- 
6-6 the referenced Test Plan # I .  
board components and protective devices to tolerate the established 
ETDLs without damage. 
Pin-injection tests will be conducted on the ECU as well as the 
other ECS engine-mounted accessories. In situations where these 
accessories also have complied with lie-to-ground, high-potential 
(hipot) test requirements that exceed the ETDLs, the ETDL pin tests 
may be waived upon presentation of hipot test reports. 
The pin-injection tests are conducted on the ECU in a power-on 
but non-operational status. other accessories will be tested in a 
power-off configuration. The pin-injection tests are described in the 
referenced Test Plan #3. 
Harness Tests 
3.5.7.2.2 System hctional upset 
Verification of the ECS’ ability to continue to perform its 
intended functions duing and after exposure to lightning’s indirect 
effects will be demonstrated by a system-upset test of a complete 
engine-mounted ECS, powered up and operating. For this test, 
induced multiple-stroke and multiple-burst transients are trans- 
former-coupled or directly injected into the harness shields while the 
system is operating in each operational mode. These tests will be 
conducted on a system installed on the same engine case that was 
utilized for the harness-shield current tests of section 3.5.7.1 -1. The 
test currents will be full-threat, harness-shield ETDLs as defmed in 
Table 5 ,  applied in the multiple-stroke mode, with one transient 
corresponding to current component A, as defmed in Table 5 
followedby23 transientsofone fourththisamplitude,correspondmg 
to component D12, all within two seconds, as defmed in AC 20-136 
The system-upset test is described in the referenced Test Plan #4. 
[41. 
determine conductor 
voitages/currents 
and verify conductor 
TCL‘s 
3.5.7.3 Sequence of verification tests 
The four tests described in the preceding subsections will be 
conductedinthe sequence showninFigure4,so that theresults ofone 
r 
verify damage 
ETDL‘s 
Equipment Pin Tests tokmnces of 
determine shield 
shield TCL‘s 
Engine Tests currents and verify 
System Upset Tests 
verify system upset 
tolermce of ETDL‘s 
FIGURE 4 Sequence of venjlcation tests 
test are available to support the next and substantiate any design 
changes that might be necessitated by test results. In this way, the 
tests provide a building-block approach to certification, and allow 
each level of the protection to be validated. 
Test Plan References 
#1. Engine-mounted harness-shield current test plan 
#2. Engine-mounted harness-conductor voltage/cunent 
test plan 
#3. ECS-equipment damage-tolerance test plan 
#4. ECS system functional upset test plan 
END OF “LTI-1000 CERTIFICATION PLAN” 
4.0 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS OF 
ANALYSIS 
4.1 AIRCRAFTIENGINE T C E  
VERIFICATION TESTS 
As noted in Section 3.5.7.1 of the certification plan for the 
hypothetical L T I - 1 0  engine, the verification that TCLs associated 
with intra-engine cables (i.e., between engine and engine-mounted 
accessories) do not exceed the specified values for these circuits, is 
accomplished by an LTA test of an engine housing with all engine- 
mounted accessories and all intra-engine wiring harnesses in place. 
This low-level pulse test may be conducted on an engine by itself, 
rather than in a completely configured vehicle, because the TCLs of 
interest here are associated only with engine-mounted circuits. For 
verification of theTCLs assigned to the engine-aircraft circuits (Le., 
between engine and CVU or pilot-input force transducers) a full- 
vehicle LTA test may be required. LTA tests should also include 
measurements of bulk-cable currents, currents on cable shields, 
magnetic fields within stnrctures and structural IR voltages when 
appropriate. 
4.1.1 Approach 
LTA tests usually are low-level current pulse tests with the 
waveshapes of Component A and H as defied in FAA AC 20-1 36 [4] 
Appendix 111. Other components are not used since the Components 
B and C produce insignificant indirect effects and the effects of 
Component D are exceeded by the effects of Component A. The 
resulting inducedvohage and current transients in the aircraft wiring 
and harnesses will be measured and recorded by oscilloscopes 
located in or near the aircraft. Peak currents applied to the airframe 
generally can be l i i t ed  to 1 kA or less to prevent any damage from 
occurring to the aircraft or avionic equipment. The measured data 
will then be extrapolatedlinearly to predict the actual transient levels 
that would appear in interconnecting wires during a full-threat, 200 
kA stroke to the aircraft. An overview oftheproceduresandpractices 
to conduct low-level pulse LTA tests may be found in “Lightning 
protection testing offill-scaleaircraft to determine inducedtransient 
levels,” by M.M. Dargi 161, ‘‘Lightning protection ofaircrafi.”[7] and 
NASA CR-2524 “Lightning effects on theNASA F-8 digital-fly-by- 
wire airplane.” (81 No further discussion of full-vehicle tests is 
provided in this paper. 
4.2 ETDL VERIFICATION TESTS 
In December 1989, the Radio Technical Commission for Aero- 
nautics (RTCA) issued revision C of DO-160 Section 22, providing 
standard procedures for the conduct of lightning-induced transient 
susceptibility tests. Because of the rapid proliferation of sensitive 
electronics into more and more aspects of fight contro1,Ihe trend 
toward lower operating voltages in these electronics, ihd the advent 
of “off-the-shelf’ aeronautic devices intended for installation in a 
variety ofapplications,RTCA DO-160C Section22 hasbeen deemed 
inadequate. Since that time, the committees SAE AML and 
EUROCAE WG-31 SGI have been working on a revision. This will 
address, in greater detail, the waveforms, test levels, configuration 
of equipment-under-test (EUT), test procedures, measurement pro- 
cedures, test equipment and safety procedures required for the 
conduct of ETDL verification tests for individualLRUs. Additional 
tests are usually necessary for verification of complete, intercon- 
nected FADEC and FBW systems. 
As ETDL tests are generally bench tests performed by the 
equipment vendors to the specifications of the system integrator or 
airframe manufacturer, the success of the overall lightning protec- 
tion for the entire aircraft may depend on the authenticity ofthe test 
simulation conducted by the equipment vendor. It may not be 
sufficient to perform ETDL tests, especially for system-functional 
upset, on a generic basis. It is preferable to perform ETDL analyses 
which relate to the actual configuration for the specific aircraft. 
Using DO-160 as a baseline, engineers should tailor ETDL tests to 
reflect actual operating loads, power- and signal-cable sizes, types 
and routing. Failure to do so could, at best, result in unneccessary 
expenseandaircraftweight dueto overdesign- at worst,underdesign. 
4.2.1 Pin-Injection Tests 
Pin-injection tests are designed to defme a very specific level of 
damage tolerance. Depending on thetype ofEUT, these tests should 
be conducted with different methods and different pasdfail criteria, 
For simple electricaVelectromechanica1 components, such as 
valves, solenoids and switches, which are normally isolated fiom 
case or aircraft ground, the hipot or dielectric-withstand test is used. 
The EUT is unpowered and test currents are applied pin-to-case in 
accordance with specified ETDLs and idealized waveforms of DO- 
160. Figure5agivesatypicaltestsetup. IftheEUTsuffinovoltage 
breakdown to case, then the unit has been verified to withstand the 
specified damage-tolerance ETDL. 
For simple electricaVelectromechanica1 components which are 
normally referenced to case or local aircraft ground, a circuit- 
damage tolerance test is also required. In this situation, the EUT is 
normally powered because the follow-on currents from the power 
bus would accentuate any damage and make detection of potential 
circuit damage clearly distinguishable. Test currents are applied pin- 
to-case or pin-to-pin. Figure 5b illustrates a typical configuration. If 
no unintentional voltage breakdown to case occurs and there is no 
component damage, then the EUT has passed. Some iuipment 
includes suppression devices that will intentionally shunt current to 
case. 
For more complex electrical and electronic components -typi- 
cally those containing solid-state circuitry - two possible conditions 
exist. When, under normal operating conditions, operating voltage 
constraints, impedance definitions, ground conditions and loading 
characteristics for the EUT are controlled by other equipment 
supplied by a different vendor, and the EUT manufacturer has no 
indication of suppression devices or filtering on interconnecting 
wiring, then pin tests must be performed to full specification of 
voltage and current. 
In the second case, if loads and other operating parameters for the 
EUT are under the control of the EUT manufacturer, then any he- 
to-ground surge impedance and he-to-ground load impedance 
which exist in the interconnecting wiring may be used to relax test 
currents applied to the appropriate EUT pin. Since cable lengths and 
geometry play arole in surge characteristics,and they are not usually 
under the control of the EUT manufacturer, then relaxation of the 
specifications should be limited to line-to-ground transmission l i e  
impedances only - typically from full specification of 5 ohms to 50 
to 100 ohms. This is usually applied only to waveforms 2 and 4, and 
waveform 5 if used as a pin test. 
In both cases, power is applied to the unit, but loads are not 
interconnected. Transients are applied pin-to-case or pairs of pins- 
to-case under the assumption that case is power ground. Pasdfail 
conditions are again unintentional voltage breakdown, component 
damage and loss of function after the EUT is reconnected to the 
system. One special condition which must be considered is that 
testing must assess the possibility of change-of-state in the circuitry. 
To ensure that worst-case situations have been evaluated, circuits 
should be tested in both states. Because verification tests are per- 
formed under certification conditions and EUT configuration may 
not be altered, some developmental breadboard testing of specific 
circuits may be required to evaluate certain circuits in both states. 
internal 
circuits A 
surge 
generator 
internal ground 
FIGURE 5a Pin-injection of an ungrounded system FIGURE 5b Pin-injection of a grounded system 
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4.2.2 Functional tests 
Functional tests are designed to evaluate the LRU, its wiring 
hamesses and its loads as an integrated and functioning system or 
subsystem. DO-160 is again a minimum requirement specification 
designed for off-the-shelf components; when that component is 
integrated into a system, the ETDL verification should reflect the 
actual configuration of the installed system. Particular attention 
should be given to ensure that bench tests reflect the actual lengths, 
orientation and operating conditions of interconnecting wiring, such 
as cable routing, cable size, cable types, shielding, cable branching, 
actual loads or load simulation. In short, transient susceptibility 
shouldbeverified toactualconfigurationforeachandeverywire,not 
to a generic cable-bundle specification. ETDLs should be tested 
separately to each interface, not simultaneously to all interfaces, 
because this would pose a much lower threat to certain LRU 
interfaces. For example, if lo00 amps is specified for a connector, 
then lo00 amps should be applied to each connector, not lOOOamps 
applied to a cable bundle with many connectors. The setups illus- 
trated in DO-1 60 are very generic, consisting of one LRU, with one 
cable and one load; most actual installations are not as simple. DO- 
16Omust be usedasabaselineanddoptedto theaircraftinstallation. 
The closer the test setup is to actual installation, the less analysis will 
be required to correlate the test with verification requirements. The 
result will be increased safety, and may also reduce the use of 
unnecessary suppression devices. If generic tests require that every 
interface withstand a specified level of threaty but a thorough 
simulation shows that particular connectors will be subject to lower 
transient levels due to their actual configuration, those connectors 
will require less protection. 
In all such tests, the EUT must be fully functional. System 
responses, as seen by the pilot, are monitored for unacceptable 
responses per specified passlfail criteria. 
5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 
Because it is rarely practical to perform fill-threat tests on fully 
configured aircraft, the key to successful protection will be the 
degree to which the system and subsystem tests simulate actual 
internal lightning conditions to be expected in the complete aircraft 
with all components interconnected and operational. These tests will 
depend in turn, upon the accuracy of the airframe manufacturer’s or 
system integrator’s prediction of TCLs, the thoroughness of ETDL 
verification as tested by the system suppliers, and the sufficiency of 
the margins to account for any uncertainties in these conditions. The 
coordination between the airframe manufacturer and systemlsub 
system suppliers in this process is fundamental to adequate protec- 
tion. 
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